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Grain Belt's Not So Big News

2/23/2024

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Someone sent me this article earlier this week.  It tries to pretend that Grain Belt Express has made some sort of regulatory or procedural progress... like it got things *approved*.  But the reality is that the only things GBE recently got was a well-deserved kick in the behind from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and a big nothing from the U.S. Department of Energy.  Big deal.  Must have been a slow news day... or just one ripe for propaganda and fake news.

​Let's go to the DOE thing first.
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That's right... zero plus zero is still zero.  GBE is still a big, fat zero.  FAST-41 is supposed to be a government run program that "speeds up" the environmental review for selected projects.  Except, the government getting involved has never sped up anything!  Government slows everything because of its pendulous rules and process.  GBE's Environmental Impact Statement has already been underway for more than a year, and it's already at least 6 months behind schedule.  And there's no end in sight.  How would anyone even know if FAST-41 speeds up the GBE EIS, since it's already behind the non-FAST schedule?  This is just a waste of time and tax dollars, let's move on to FERC.

The article says
Grain Belt Express is also making procedural headway at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Say what?  Did this silly reporter even READ the FERC Order he's reporting on?  I'm thinking no, because no sane person would have read that Order and decided it was favorable to GBE.  What GBE got from FERC was nothing but a scolding.

We've known for quite a while that GBE was going to connect to MISO and AECI in Callaway County at the existing McCreedie subtation and also at a new substation it is sharing with Ranger Power's immense solar farm.  The new substation is called Burns.  Burns will be owned and built by incumbent utility Ameren (however I hear that Ranger Power bought the land and scraped all the topsoil off it before handing it over to Ameren).  Ameren has been ordered to build this substation and connect both Ranger Power and GBE by regional grid operator MISO.  Ameren cannot refuse to build it.   In addition, MISO's studies determined that there needs to be two new 345kV high-voltage transmission lines from the new Burns substation to the existing Montgomery substation (in Montgomery Co.) in order for GBE to connect.  The existing line cannot carry enough power and new ones must be built.  Ameren has also been ordered to build these new transmission lines, although GBE must pay for them.

GBE's interconnection to MISO was subject to a Transmission Connection Agreement between the parties.  The TCA is a pretty standard thing that relies in large part on MISO's filed tariff with FERC.  TCAs can be negotiated somewhat and once they are complete, they are filed with FERC for approval.  Except GBE could not agree with MISO on a number of issues so MISO filed the TCA with FERC unexecuted (unsigned).  FERC approved that unsigned TCA.  GBE had asked FERC to make several changes to the TCA and force MISO to do certain things, and for FERC to make Ameren hurry up and build the new transmission lines that GBE needs to make its connection at Burns.  FERC declined to make any of GBE's suggested changes and told GBE it was not necessary to tell Ameren to hurry up.  GBE got NOTHING it asked for here.  GBE was legally smacked upside the head.  FERC has sided with its regional transmission organization, MISO, on all issues.  This really isn't novel or different.  FERC always sides with its pet RTOs.  GBE is just stupid if it thinks it can challenge MISO and get a different result.  Maybe now Polsky will get a clue about why they "don't hear from them" on all the complaints Invenergy has filed against MISO?

Although the TCA was approved by FERC, it doesn't do anything to make GBE's connection happen faster.  It's still scheduled for, maybe, 2030.  GBE had asked FERC to force MISO to connect some smaller portion of capacity in 2027.  Not happening.

Why is this such an issue for GBE?  Here's a quote from the Order:
Grain Belt asserts that, with respect to the reasons for delaying the In-Service Date of the GBX Line, Ameren Missouri did not mention that its affiliate, Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois, was awarded a number of transmission facilities under MISO’s Long-Range Transmission Planning process, which it is constructing with planned In-Service Dates of 2028 and 2030. 
That's right, folks!  MISO ordered Ameren to build new transmission lines to be in service in 2028 and 2030 for the purpose of importing wind and solar energy from Iowa to Missouri and Illinois.  These regionally planned lines are cost allocated to all ratepayers in MISO.  This means that the cost to use them is going to be considerably LESS than the bloated $7B merchant transmission Grain Belt Express.  In fact, ratepayers are going to be paying for the new Ameren lines, even if they choose to use GBE instead.  Let's see... renewable energy on new lines you pay for OR renewable energy on the GBE, which costs a lot more, and then you STILL have to pay for the Ameren lines anyhow.  Doesn't take an energy trader to figure out that problem.

The Ameren lines will be cheaper.  Therefore, GBE is in a big hurry to try to get its bloated behemoth online before Ameren gets those lines built.  Looks like that's not going to be possible.

GBE is stripped bare... it's too expensive and obsolete.  Who would want to be a customer?  And, speaking of customers, GBE still does not have negotiated rate authority to try to find any.  No matter though... GBE can't connect its project until at least 2030, when there will be better options for renewable energy transmission service in MISO.
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PJM Charges Ratepayers in Other States for Data Center Extension Cords

2/11/2024

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Virginia has a problem with data centers.  It created tax exemptions to draw them in.  Northern Virginia is situated near a bloated federal government that needs a place to store all its data.  And "data center alley" was born.  It has since reached outlandish proportions, and more data centers are being approved every day.  Data center sprawl is a serious problem.

Perhaps the biggest problem for the largest concentration of data centers in the world is powering them all.  Data centers use huge amounts of electricity, and as new technology created more ways for data centers to burn electricity, it soon became impossible to power them with the electricity available.  Couple this with state "clean energy" policy that prohibits the building of any new fossil fuel generation, and you've created a recipe for disaster.

This disaster recently manifested as PJM's 2022 Window 3 transmission plan.  Regional grid operator and planner PJM Interconnection was tasked with finding a solution to the closing of 11,000 MW of existing fossil fuel generation in Virginia and Maryland combined with 7,500 MW of new data center load in Northern Virginia.  PJM did the only thing it knows how to do... create new electric extension cords across the region that will import electricity to data center alley from fossil fuel generators in other states.  The only two states in PJM that export electricity are Pennsylvania and West Virginia, where coal is still king.  Pennsylvania produces electricity mainly from natural gas and nuclear, with a significant amount of coal still in its mix.  West Virginia's electricity mix is over 90% coal.

The new extension cords are 3 new 500kV transmission lines pumping electricity to data center alley from Pennsylvania and West Virginia.  It's bad enough that the new extension cords will plow through communities in other states, expanding transmission easements and cutting new ones, but PJM also expects electric customers in other states to pay for a significant share of the cost of these new extension cords.  What do Pennsylvania and West Virginia get from this?  New transmission lines, property destruction and devaluation.  They don't get any electricity... that's all going to Northern Virginia.

When approving this destructive (and unlikely to actually happen) transmission plan, PJM selected the cost allocation scheme that spreads the costs of the projects as widely as possible across its region.  The thinking there is that spreading the $6B cost among as many people as possible won't be noticed by individual electric consumers.  If PJM allocated the costs solely to the causers of the new transmission lines (the state of Virginia) then the rate increases they cause will be very noticeable.  In fact, it may be so noticeable that businesses and residents may begin to leave Virginia for neighboring states where electricity is more affordable.

PJM is complicit with the State of Virginia to cover up its data center disaster by inflicting new transmission on other states instead of the state that caused it.  Sure, Virginia is being allocated a huge chunk, but not all.  Another huge chunk is still being spread among all PJM consumers as far away as Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New Jersey, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Maryland, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.  This is because PJM selected the cost allocation scheme that allocates 50% of the cost of the new projects to everyone in the region based on their peak load percentage from the prior year.  An area that uses a lot of electricity gets a bigger share, for instance electric customers in Northern Illinois are paying a larger share of this 50% than electric customers in Virginia that will actually use the electricity piped in on the new extension cords.  Why is anyone in any state other than Virginia paying for this new data center transmission?

The other 50% of the costs are allocated based on cost causation, with load areas at or near the data centers paying a higher percentage.  However, the load areas near the data center are enormous.  The Dominion zone where the data centers are being built also consists of customers in all parts of Virginia, plus some in North Carolina.  The Allegheny Power zone contains customers at/near the data centers, but it also spreads to cover a huge chunk of West Virginia and Pennsylvania.  Why are consumers hundreds of miles from the data centers paying so much money to build extension cords for Virginia's new data centers?  This isn't fair.

PJM's cost allocation schemes are part of its FERC-approved tariff.  However, PJM must receive FERC approval for each individual collection of transmission projects to ensure they have chosen the correct cost allocation scheme for the projects.  PJM filed to spread the costs across the region back in January, which opened a 30-day comment period.

While lots of entities intervened in the FERC docket for this cost allocation, only 3 comments were received.  That's right... only 3 entities thought this was unfair.  Two of them are residential ratepayers, and the other is the Maryland Office of People's Counsel.

I filed these comments.  I asked FERC to open an investigation into the justness and reasonableness of PJM's cost allocation and took the position that the "clean energy" policies of Virginia and Maryland caused the retirement of 11,000 MW of baseload generation in their states.  Also, only Virginia is responsible for the 7,500 MW of new data center load.  West Virginians should not be paying for these new transmission lines.  Being the "power house" for the electric supply for Virginia's data centers ties West Virginia into many more years of coal-fired electricity production.  Even if West Virginia wanted to close those old, dirty plants, they cannot because Virginia needs the power for their data centers.
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Pennsylvania electric consumer Barron Shaw filed these comments.  Barron's comments are similar and underscore the way Pennsylvania and West Virginia are being used to power some of the wealthiest companies in the world.  People in Pennsylvania and West Virginia get little to no benefit from these companies or their new extension cords and will actually end up paying higher power prices in their own states as all the "cheap" electricity is sucked out of their own states to power a wealthier economy in Northern Virginia.  It's basic supply/demand.  Plenty of power makes cheap electricity prices.  When so much power is exported that electricity becomes scarce, prices rise.
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Those two comments are probably understandable to the average reader.  However, the Maryland Office of People's Counsel also filed comments and expert testimony purporting that PJM picked the wrong allocation scheme and should have used the one that allocates all the costs to the state responsible.  PJM's other cost allocation scheme is called the "State Agreement Approach" and is used when a state agrees to shoulder the entire cost of transmission made necessary by its public policies.  SAA has been used for New Jersey's offshore wind planning.  PJM planned new transmission to support NJ offshore wind, and NJ agreed to pay for it.  Maryland OPC believes PJM must break down the suite of transmission projects to determine which ones are for other reasons, and which ones are for the data centers.  Once this breakdown is made, Virginia should be charged for the entirety of the data center portion.  Maryland's filing is probably a hard read if you don't speak FERC though, so read at your own risk.  It may seem like you're reading a foreign language.
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Now it's up to FERC to decide... should electric consumers in other states be charged for Virginia's data center extension cords?  Maybe if Virginia had to shoulder the entire cost of its data center debacle it would have to realize that approving a whole bunch of new data centers comes at a cost.  Outrageous electricity prices in Virginia are the consequence of out-of-control development.  PJM is helping Virginia avoid the true cost of its policies and shuffling costs off onto other states that had no part in approving the data centers and certainly will not see any benefit from them.  PJM also selected new transmission projects that put most of the burden on other states.  PJM could have selected the proposal that kept new transmission lines in Virginia by connecting to AEP's 765kV transmission system west of Richmond.  But it did not.  PJM is complicit in Virginia's irresponsible energy policies and therefore responsible for the energy crisis that is the logical result of continued data center development.  Why, PJM, why?  

PJM won't be successful in getting all these new transmission lines built in other states, and certainly not by their projected "need" dates in 2027.  What then?  Will the lights go out?  PJM made the wrong choice and we're all going to have to pay.
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Illinois Groups Ask FERC to Dismiss GBE's Request to Amend its Negotiated Rate Authority

12/29/2023

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There's a new filing in the on-going saga of GBE's FERC Negotiated Rate Authority.  As I wrote earlier, here and here, Grain Belt Express recently asked FERC to approve an "amendment" to its existing negotiated rate authority.  Missouri Landowners Alliance filed a protest and asked FERC to consider all the changes to the project, including its change of ownership since the original Negotiated Rate Authority was issued.  Missouri Landowners Alliance questioned whether GBE needed approval for the sale of its project to Invenergy under Sec. 203 of the Federal Power Act.  Invenergy responded saying that it didn't need permission.  But is that really true?

Yesterday, a coalition of Illinois groups filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, asking that FERC deny GBE's request for amendment to the existing negotiated rate authority.  The Illinois groups contend that when the project was sold, the negotiated rate authority issued to Clean Line expired because GBE did not get FERC approval for the sale.
In GBX’s view, the Commission has no jurisdiction over GBX’s activities until GBX hammers iron into the ground (GBX Limited Answer, pgs. 2-3); until that time, GBX is free to transfer that negotiated rate authority like a collectable baseball card. GBX’s logic makes a mockery of both the process by which the Commission determines whether an applicant should be granted negotiated rate authority and the Commission’s authority to review and approve sales, mergers and other transactions under FPA Section 203. 
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And that pretty much describes ALL of the regulatory activity on GBE since Invenergy bought the project.  GBE has treated all its approvals as collectible baseball cards.  Invenergy did not buy a transmission project, it bought a set of state and federal approvals, and then methodically set about changing the actual project that was permitted without the regulator actually examining the new project.  It simply transferred the permits to a new project without proper examination.

The Illinois groups make the case why GBE should have to get the sale of its project approved, not simply "amend" its existing authority without proper examination of changed circumstances.

When GBE filed for its NRA "amendment" in early October, it expected to sail through a mere rubber stamping of its request so it could have new authority granted by December 5.  December 5 came, and December 5 went.  FERC doesn't seem to be in any particular hurry to ink up its stamp, and now that there is considerable controversy in this case, FERC must spend more time figuring things out.  GBE cannot advertise its capacity for sale, nor sign contracts to sell it, until it has FERC approval.

This must be extremely frustrating to Invenergy CEO Michael Polsky.  In a recent interview on Bloomberg, Polsky lamented that "we don't hear much" from FERC on a number of open dockets.  Isn't that a shame?  FERC isn't dancing to Polsky's serenade.  Also in this interview Polsky says that he thinks "the government" should pay for new transmission.  Well, that would make things rather simple for GBE, wouldn't it?  Then the merchant transmission project wouldn't need customers to fund it before it is built.  In Polsky's world, anyone who wants to build a transmission project would simply shake the taxpayer piggy bank until enough money falls out. Perhaps that's the way things work in Ukraine, but that's not where Polsky is operating.  He chose to come to this country and he must abide by our laws.

And while we're thinking about the elite Mr. Polsky, perhaps this article can also shed some light on how he makes money controlling energy policy?

Meanwhile, FERC continues to do "not much" on Invenergy's numerous open dockets, and Invenergy keeps filing stuff, like this recent complaint.  It must be really frustrating not to have a federal regulatory agency under your super rich thumb.

P.S.  Nice jacket!  Where does he find them?  Nightclub yard sale?
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Lessons from a Bad Omen

12/20/2023

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The Potomac-Appalachian Transmission Highline, or PATH project died yesterday.  It was nobody's friend at the end.  I don't think anyone is going to miss it, even PATH itself.  It's been an albatross around everyone's neck, including mine, ever since FERC decided to second-guess itself on the matter in 2020.

An uncontested settlement was filed at FERC on November 17 that created a lump sum refund for PJM ratepayers of $9.5M.  The refund came as a result of the DC Circuit Opinion back in 2021 that determined PATH's advocacy and advertising costs should not have been collected from ratepayers.  Also included in the lump sum was a final accounting for money due under PATH's formula rate.  The settlement also provides for the cancellation of PATH's formula rate and cancellation of the companies themselves.  In several months, PATH will be nothing but a bad dream and a lightness in your wallet.

Because FERC had failed to act (again) on the DC Circuit remand and a paper hearing FERC opened on PATH's return on equity in 2020, the parties to the long-running formula rate and abandonment cases took it upon themselves to ink out a deal and present it to FERC for approval.  FERC allowed PATH to begin collecting money for its project beginning in 2008, and it won't stop collecting until 2024.  That's 16 years.  Much of that time came courtesy of an overworked and tone-deaf FERC simply ignoring the issues PATH created for years on end.  Two years to grant our formal challenges, 3 more years to get them to hearing, 2 more years to issue an order, 3 more years to grant rehearing and do a 180 on FERC's first decision, only a year at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals straightening that out, and then 2 more years before the settling parties, including yours truly, finally pulled the plug to short circuit another long period of waiting for FERC to act.  To its credit, FERC jumped right on the settlement when it was presented and approved it yesterday, just a mere month after it was filed.  But why did it take us doing FERC's job for them to get this resolved?

Yesterday, a public shaming of PATH, utilities, PJM, and FERC itself came courtesy of FERC Commissioner Mark Christie during the monthly Commission meeting.  You can watch it here beginning at minute 13:48 and ending at 18:24.  Just five minutes of your time to get the satisfaction you've been seeking for 16 years.  I love a happy ending like this!  PATH was a terrible idea that has caused harm to consumers.
Commissioner Christie also issued a written statement to append to the Commission's Letter Order approving the PATH settlement.  You can read it here.
Christie used PATH as a reason to take issue with FERC's overly generous incentives, formula rates, and long-term planning for transmission that is purposed to serve needs that never materialize.

Commissioner Christie has been on the warpath against certain overly-generous FERC incentives, issuing strongly worded statements in 13 cases over the past 2 years (all footnoted in yesterday's statement).  He pointed out that FERC has opened several proceedings to investigate and change the Commission's incentive rules since 2019, but still has not managed to conclude those proceedings (PL19-3, RM20-10).  Christie also noted that the Commission proposed discontinuing the CWIP incentive in its also pending Rulemaking on Transmission Planning (Docket RM21-17).

A highly politicized FERC means the agency can't get anything done and has found itself at a standoff over many issues over the past 8 years.  Commissioner Christie stands alone as the most consumer-focused Commissioner FERC has ever had.  He has tirelessly fought for consumers and will continue to do so.  Commissioner Christie came to FERC from the Virginia State Corporation Commission in 2021, and will serve until 2025.  We need more commissioners like Christie, who have a history of serving at state utility commissions, and less Commissioners from the political and special interest realms that have dominated appointments over the past 8 years.  FERC needs to go back to its  function as an impartial regulator, not a political vehicle for the policies of the administration in charge.  Sadly, I don't see things changing much in 2024.  

Commissioner Christie used yesterday's PATH settlement as a lesson and a warning, referring to it as an "omen" of more bad things to come if FERC's policies are not reformed.  He used PATH as an example of how these different policies come together to create zombie projects that can pick ratepayer pockets for decades.  According to Christie, PATH was originally part of Project Mountaineer, a PJM scheme to import electricity to eastern load centers from the Ohio River Valley's massive fleet of coal-fired generators.  Once PJM approved PATH and added the project to its regional plan, that turned on the money spigots.  Thanks to FERC's overly-generous award of every incentive possible and its use of formula rates, PATH began collecting its costs from ratepayers in 2008, during its development and permitting stage.  The Commission's policies allowed PATH to continue to collect its costs during the long period between PJM's approval and state regulatory approval.  Although PATH never received any state approval, and nothing was ever built, its formula rate continued to recover costs from consumers, even after PJM abandoned the project in 2012.  PATH is still collecting a cool million (or more) from consumers every year to this day.  The Commission's approval of the settlement yesterday shuts off the money spigot... finally.

Commissioner Christie cautioned against making long-term transmission plans based on today's generation choices. PATH demonstrates that those choices can change quickly, although the transmission projects set in motion to achieve them cannot.  It was wise advice to a Commission that is poised to pass new long-term transmission planning rules in 2024 based on today's generation choices of wind and solar.  The Commission needs to think carefully about saddling consumers with the cost of new transmission that could become obsolete before it is even built, such as PJM's recent slate of projects for the purpose of importing fossil fuel electricity to Virginia's data centers from the Ohio Valley.  PJM has acknowledged that new wind and solar additions are not keeping up with fossil fuel generator retirements in its eastern regions, but yet the generators keep closing and the data centers keep being built.  Something has to change, or the lights are going to go out.  PJM chose to approve a bunch of new PATH projects from the west, including the NextEra/FirstEnergy project from southwest Pennsylvania to Loudoun County.

We should all heed Commissioner Christie's warning, and support needed changes to FERC's incentives and transmission policy choices.  A group of consumers filed comments on FERC's transmission planning rulemaking back in 2021.  Check out the discussion of the PATH project beginning on page 21.
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This is the same history lesson Commissioner Christie taught yesterday.  Christie said the PATH debacle has cost consumers nearly a quarter of a billion dollars over the past 15 years... all for nothing.  Christie quoted what Willy Loman’s wife Linda said in Death of a Salesman, "attention must be paid."  Let's hope proper attention is paid to the demise of PATH.  I, for one, won't miss it.  It frees up my time to pay attention to things ahead, such as the new PATH-like projects recently approved by PJM.

Let the funeral dirge play... we beat you, PATH.  We beat you BAD.
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NextEra Files for Transmission Rate Incentives for its MARL Project

12/16/2023

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On November 22, NextEra filed an application at FERC to be granted certain transmission rate incentives for its MidAtlantic Resiliency Link, or MARL transmission project.  Of course, we know that the PJM Board of Managers didn't approve the MARL project until December 11.  But somehow NextEra was so certain it would receive the assignment that it felt free to apply for incentives for its proposed project ahead of time.  And let's just leave that fact on the table to contemplate.

Here's a link to MARL's filing.  It's huge, but you may want to only pay attention to the first 17 pages and the supporting testimony... for now.  The weird-looking multi-page tables appended at the end of the filing are MARL's formula rate.  This is how MARL determines how much to charge ratepayers for the project.  The ones attached to this filing are blank, but MARL will be making future filings with the numbers filled in.  That's a whole different process that perhaps we'll examine in the future.  The request for incentives is enough complicated crap for today's menu.

FERC's transmission incentives -- a long, complicated story.  Pull up a chair and get a cup of coffee, you're going to need it.

Back in 2005, Congress decided that not enough electric transmission was being built.  They reasoned this was what caused the 2003 Northeast blackout (I beg to differ, but that's a whole different blog for another day).  Congress passed Sec. 219 of the Energy Policy Act directing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to establish, by rule, incentive-based rate treatments to promote capital investment in electric transmission infrastructure.  Over the course of several proceedings, FERC developed a number of incentives to financially reward and protect utilities who undertook new transmission projects.  The incentives have been looked at several times since, with the most recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in 2020.  Although hundreds comments were filed by regulators, utilities, special interest groups, and consumers, FERC has not yet acted.  That docket, RM20-10, is still sitting around collecting dust.  No one seems to find this more frustrating than FERC Commissioner Mark Christie, who finds himself obligated to approve them every time, but issues virtually the same opinion every time that several of them are unjust and unreasonable and need to be reformed.  FERC is at an impasse.

FERC's incentives include ROE adders, hypothetical capital structure, pre-commercial cost recovery, accelerated depreciation and advanced technology, and two that MARL has requested, abandonment and CWIP in ratebase.  I've explained them ad nauseam in a special section of this blog, here.

MARL begins by telling FERC that it has already requested and been approved for several incentives, along with a formula rate, for an earlier transmission purchase.  Those incentives are:  
(i) recovery of all pre-commercial costs not capitalized and authorization to establish a regulatory asset that will include all such expenses that are incurred prior to the time costs first flow through to customers, including authorization to accrue carrying charges and amortize the regulatory asset over five years for cost recovery purposes (“Regulatory Asset Incentive”); (ii) use of a hypothetical capital structure of 60% equity and 40% debt until NEET MidAtlantic Indiana’s first project achieved commercial operations (“Hypothetical Capital Structure Incentive”); and (iii) use of a 50-basis point return on equity (“ROE”) adder for Regional Transmission Organization Participation (“RTO Participation Adder”). 
Now NextEra wants two additional incentives for MARL, along with the ability to use them for any subsequent projects.  
(i) recovery of 100 percent of prudently-incurred transmission-related costs of the Project if it is abandoned or canceled for reasons beyond the control of NEET MidAtlantic Indiana (“Abandoned Plant Incentive”); (ii) authorization to include 100 percent of prudently incurred Construction Work in Progress (“CWIP”) in rate base for the Project (“CWIP Incentive”); and (iii) authorization to assign the requested Abandoned Plant and CWIP Incentives, if approved, to any newly-formed PJM affiliate of NEET MidAtlantic Indiana that is involved in the development and construction of the MidAtlantic Resiliency Link Project.​

What are these two incentives, and what do they do?

First, let's look at the abandonment incentive.  It guarantees that the transmission owner (MARL) may collect all its prudently incurred costs for the project in the event that it is subsequently cancelled (abandoned) before being built.  First of all, the cancellation has to be out of the control of MARL, such as PJM cancelling the project due to an inability to get approvals or meet in-service dates.  PJM could also discover in a subsequent analysis that the project is no longer needed.  If that happens, MARL would need to make another filing with FERC detailing all the money it has spent on the project and a statement that they were all prudently incurred.  If FERC approves that filing, ratepayers would have to reimburse MARL for its costs, even though nothing is ever built.

Abandonment happens all the time.  One of the most famous is the PATH project that was abandoned in 2012 before a shovel ever hit the ground.  That debacle cost ratepayers around $500M, for a project that never happened.

In deciding whether to grant the abandonment incentive, FERC evaluates project risks.  If the project presents financial or other risks to the utility, then FERC grants it.  Therefore, MARL has told FERC that its project is extremely risky in order to be granted this incentive.  Some of the things MARL told FERC:
In addition, the Project requires construction of approximately 129-line miles of 500 kV transmission lines, 24 miles of which is located in a greenfield corridor that crosses through Loudoun County, Virginia, which is one of the wealthiest counties in America. Project opposition from residents in this County is foreseeable and may result in permitting delays, undergrounding requirements that may increase the costs associated with the Project, and/or litigation over the Project’s scope and construction. The Project also spans across four different states—West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania—which will require NEET MidAtlantic Indiana to obtain necessary permits and approvals from a large number of different state and local regulatory bodies and will subject the Project to numerous different environmental and other regulatory standards and requirements. Finally, the Project is directly reliant on the construction of a 36-mile increment of 500 kV transmission lines being developed by First Energy as the incumbent transmission owner. Delays or cancellation associated with First Energy’s construction of its 36-mile increment may impact NEET MidAtlantic Indiana’s ability to obtain permits, finalize construction, and place into service the MidAtlantic Resiliency Link Project in a timely fashion. 


Additionally, the Commission has also recognized that large, new interstate projects can face substantial risks and challenges not presented by more ordinary transmission investments. Like other large interstate projects, the MidAtlantic Resiliency Link Project will span across four different states and many more localities, each with its own regulatory permitting requirements. The Project also traverses across regions of Virginia, such as Loudon County, that have traditionally been litigious when it comes to new, significant transmission build, and similar opposition is expected here. This opposition could result in Project delays or the inability to obtain certain required permits, such as a certificate of public convenience and necessity, ultimately resulting in cancellation of the Project for reasons outside of NEET MidAtlantic Indiana’s reasonable control.
Could those things happen?  Of course, but consider that MARL is making more of them for FERC's benefit.  Perhaps it's more useful as a list of vulnerable spots for opponents to attack.

The second incentive MARL requested is CWIP in ratebase.  CWIP stands for "Construction Work in Progress."  CWIP (pronounced "quip") is the financial account where all the project's capital costs are recorded until it is completed and enters service.  It can be treated two different ways.   

The first is for the company to add interest to the account each year as it slowly builds during construction, and to begin collecting the costs (plus interest) once the project goes into service.  Utilities find this difficult because they have to handle their debt until the project is finished.  It hurts their financial health to have huge amounts of unreimbursed debt on their books.  It can also hurt ratepayers because when collection begins, it can create huge, lumpy rate increases.

The second is for the company to include CWIP balances in their ratebase and earn a return (interest) on them right away, while the project is being constructed.  With this incentive, MARL will begin earning a profit on the money it spends as it spends it.  This allows MARL to pump this profit back into the project, instead of investing more of its own money or borrowing.  It helps their finances.  It can also help ratepayers because they begin paying for the project during construction, little by little, as the costs of the project add up.  Instead of a huge rate increase all at once, ratepayers pay increasing costs over time.

What's a ratebase?  Now we're going down the rabbit hole of transmission rates.  It's extremely complicated, but I'll try to give you the Cliff's Notes version.  FERC uses formula rates for transmission.  A formula rate is a formula that determines the utility's rate each year so that rates can change without a full rate process each year.  Instead of a dollar amount, the utility's rate is the formula itself.  The formula is that set of schedules, tables, and attachments that is stuck onto the end of MARL's filing.  That's MARL's formula rate.  Each year, the formula is populated with amounts from MARL's financial records and calculated using the formula to come up with an actual dollar figure.  Ratebase is the sum of all the accounts that earn a return (interest).  Ratebase, plus return, is added to the utility's Operations and Maintenance, Administrative and General costs, plus taxes, to come up with the yearly revenue requirement.  We pay the revenue requirement each year.   It is filtered through PJM's billing system and then the billing systems of the local utilities who send us our bills.  The utility must hold public rate meetings each year to present the result of their formula rate calculations.  Interested parties, described as those that pay the rates, can ask questions and submit discovery requests to see how the rate was calculated.  Yes, that includes people like us who pay an electric bill that includes some portion of these costs.  But that's all information for later...

A very simple explanation for how ratepayers pay for transmission is to liken it to the home mortgage that we're all familiar with.  The utility pays to construct the project (like the bank pays for your home) and then we pay the utility back over time, plus interest, just like we pay our home mortgage.

Because MARL made this filing so early, before its project was even approved by PJM, the window to intervene and file comments on its request for incentives has already closed.  We cannot act on it.  However, I can pretty much tell you how it's going to end... FERC will approve it and Commissioner Christie will file a statement saying that those incentives need to be re-examined and possibly cancelled.  Therefore, I can't feel too bad about not having to write another FERC filing that does no good.  Comm. Christie has got our backs.

And, in closing, I'm going to make one more observation.  As we all saw during PJM's planning process, these utilities are falling all over themselves to be selected to build new projects.  It is a COMPETITIVE process, and that only happens when participants WANT to be selected.  FERC's incentives are meant to encourage utilities to build transmission even though they may not want to, or if it is financially risky for them to do so.  Are incentives really necessary in a competitive planning process?  Without them, would these utilities still be competing to be selected?  Transmission is still incredibly profitable, even without incentives.  Transmission owners earn hefty returns on the money they invest building them.  Transmission returns on equity are set much higher than other market returns, so that building transmission is the most profitable place the utility can invest its money.  They have been as high as 16% when interest rates are up, and as low as 9% when the markets are down.  Even then, they are still much higher than anything you can find to invest your own money.  FERC returns are loosely tied to markets, so they fluctuate, but once FERC sets the ROE for a transmission project, it is set in stone until another proceeding is opened to re-examine it.  Begin a project when the market is up, and you get a high return that can persist for years, even when the markets change.  Transmission is a long-lived asset, and it is paid for by ratepayers over its useful life.  The expected life of many transmission projects is 40 years.  It's like a 40-year mortgage that we're going to have to pay.
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Your Lack of Planning is NOT my Responsibility!

11/13/2023

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PJM Interconnection's solution to 2022 Window 3 transmission needs is comprised of a collection of new and upgraded 500kV transmission lines, along with a number of 230kV new lines and upgrades.  Why does this matter?  It's all about who pays.

PJM will assign project costs to different subregions of its territory according to its existing FERC-approved cost allocation rules.  As noted in a recent FERC Order, these rules are:
PJM utilizes a hybrid cost allocation method, which the Commission found complies with Order No. 1000, for Regional Facilities and Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities that address a reliability need.  Under this method, PJM allocates 50% of the costs of Regional Facilities or Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities on a load-ratio share basis and the other 50% based on the solution-based distribution factor (DFAX) method.  PJM allocates all of the costs of Lower Voltage Facilities using the solution-based DFAX method.  Cost responsibility assignments pursuant to the Order No. 1000-compliant cost allocation method are included in Schedule 12-Appendix A of the Tariff. 
500kV lines are "Regional Facilities".  It is likely that the 230kV improvements will be "Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities."  Therefore, 50% of the cost of these new lines, estimated at $5.4B, will be allocated to ALL customers in the PJM region based on their load-ratio share.  The load-ratio share, in layman's terms, is the amount of PJM's total load used by each sub-region. Everyone who pays an electric bill in PJM will pay for their share of $2.7B of new transmission that is only necessary because of the building of new data centers in Northern Virginia and the closing of fossil fuel generation made necessary by the clean energy laws of certain states.  Although the reason for the lines is caused by only a portion of the region, everyone pays.

The other 50%, or $2.7B, of the costs will be allocated using the DFAX method which, in layman's terms, would be the specific sub-regions who use the new facilities.

This is set in stone and it cannot be changed unless PJM petitions FERC to change its cost allocation rules, or FERC takes the initiative to begin a proceeding to investigate electric rates that have become unjust and unreasonable. 

This cost allocation for PJM's new projects is not fair.  However, there is nothing you can do about it.

In a recent case, PJM filed a cost allocation document for recently approved projects intended to solve the closing of the Brandon Shores coal-fired plant in Baltimore.  Most of the cost was allocated to the sub-region around Baltimore that would use the new facilities, with some smaller portions assigned to other sub-regions.  Maryland regulators didn't like this.  They thought PJM should have found other solutions to the generator closing instead of a quickly approved transmission plan that cost nearly a billion dollars.  The Maryland regulators filed a protest in PJM's cost assignment FERC docket.  FERC said that since the cost allocation PJM made was in accord with PJM's existing, FERC-approved cost allocation rules, there was nothing they could do but approve it.

However, something interesting happened there.  Commissioner Mark Christie, a champion for electric ratepayers, said it wasn't fair, although he was obligated to approve it.  You should read his Concurrence because it may be a harbinger of things to come.
PJM has told us that if we fail to approve those transmission projects in this RTEP driven by the closure of the Brandon Shores coal generating unit located in Maryland, the grid will likely suffer a severe voltage collapse in Baltimore and the surrounding zones, including Northern Virginia, the District of Columbia, Delaware and southeastern Pennsylvania. Such a result could be potentially catastrophic.
While these projects are very costly – and I take seriously the concerns expressed by the Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI), Maryland Public Service Commission (MD PSC) and Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (OPC) – given this Hobson’s choice I concur with approving PJM’s RTEP filing.
While I concur, I note that this element of the RTEP filing raises more questions than it answers, and some of those questions are extraordinarily important.  
Although perhaps he did not find the cost allocation fair, Commissioner Christie chose to approve it because of the extreme risk of blackouts if the projects were delayed by a FERC investigation into the justness and reasonableness of PJM's cost allocation policies.

We are hobbled by PJM's bad policies and poor planning practices into a future that never allocates project costs fairly.  Will people complain about the upcoming cost allocation of PJM's 2022 Window 3 projects?  Absolutely.  But will FERC open an investigation, or will it be forced into another Hobson's choice?

Commissioner Christie shared his thoughts on how PJM's cost allocation rules have been rendered unjust and unreasonable by recent events.
Let me emphasize that the State of Maryland, within its sovereign police powers, clearly has the authority to mandate any particular mix of generating resources it prefers.  Maryland’s new climate law is well within its inherent authority to enact.  Such policies are for Marylanders to choose, not RTOs or FERC.  But if the resulting transmission projects under protest in this RTEP filing are caused more by Maryland’s policy choices than by organic load growth and economic resource retirements, then a salient question that may be asked is whether these transmission projects are more accurately categorized as public policy projects, essentially the same as the transmission upgrades caused by New Jersey’s offshore wind projects?
And if they are more accurately categorized as public policy projects, should such projects be regionally cost-allocated, potentially to consumers in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, et al.?
A very relevant question that can also be applied to the current problem with PJM's 2022 Window 3.  Is the closing of more generation in certain states due to their climate laws, and the out-of-control building of new data centers that will only benefit one or two counties in Virginia, more of a public policy issue that should be paid for by the states/localities involved?  After all, it is their choice to put pressure on the amount of generation available in PJM.  Before passing laws that mandate the closing of existing generators, or before approving the building of new facilities that require extreme amounts of new electric supply, the states or localities responsible need to make sure that they still have adequate generation available to serve their load.  It is within their power to include a provision in their law that the closing of generators must be balanced with the building of new generators.  It is also within these state powers to make sure there is an adequate supply of generation in the state/locality to serve big, new electric customers like data centers, before approving them.  Instead, the states/localities are making these choices and leaving the consequences on the doorstep of others who have no vote on that state's policy choices.  This is not just and reasonable.  It's irresponsible.  It's selfish.  It pushes the consequences of a state's policy choices off on residents of other states.  In this same vein, do the voluntary policy choices of one state that requires new transmission also compel other states to use their eminent domain authority to take property from their state's residents to create easements for new transmission that serves the state making the selfish policy?  Why would I be asked to give up my property to build transmission that is caused by the building of data centers in Northern Virginia?

The "New Jersey" approach Commissioner Christie refers to is what's known as the "state agreement" approach to cost allocation.  It is a more recent construct that allows a state with a new public policy to voluntarily agree to shoulder all the costs of new transmission made necessary by their state policies.  This construct would prevent the unjust and unreasonable allocation of costs to states that did not cause the need for new transmission.  It's exactly where we find ourselves now.  The question is, would FERC open an investigation to correct PJM's current cost allocation for Window 3 to order it be allocated according to the public policy "state agreement" cost allocation approach?
It is ultimately the job of each state to ensure resource adequacy to serve its consumers, even in a multi-state RTO. ​
Amen, Commissioner Christie!  Perhaps if they did, they'd stop prematurely shutting down fossil fuel generators before replacement generation is available.  And perhaps they'd stop approving new data centers without any viable means of powering them.  Instead, it's been left on the doorstep of all the other states in the PJM region to pay for, and house, transmission only made necessary by the thoughtless politics of certain states and localities.  This is not just and reasonable.
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Clean Line's Biggest Mistake Yet!

11/8/2023

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Get your popcorn, folks, it's shaping up to be an epic battle!
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Last month, I wrote about Grain Belt's application for amendment to its negotiated rate authority at FERC, and a comment filed by the Missouri Landowner's Alliance.
Since then, several entities have intervened in the FERC docket.  First there was MEC, formerly known as MJMEUC.  Perhaps they're interested in the fact that MLA questioned whether their contract with GBE is even valid (hint:  it's not because Clean Line never made the required FERC compliance filing).  Then there was Ameren.  No idea why they intervened.  Perhaps it's because Ameren has been awarded new MISO transmission projects that compete with Grain Belt Express?  Sierra Club intervened and filed a completely clueless comment about how great GBE is.  It was completely irrelevant and had nothing to do with GBE's former (or future) negotiated rate authority.  Maybe FERC can use it in the restroom if the other paper runs out?  And then there was "Clean Line Investment LLC."  What?  Didn't Clean Line go bankrupt?  According to one Michael Skelly, who filed the Petition to Intervene,
Clean Line Investment LLC (“Clean Line Investment”) is a Delaware Limited Liability Company that was formed for purposes of investments in independent transmission projects.  Clean Line Investment was a financial partner in Clean Line Energy Partners LLC, which originally developed the Grain Belt Express Project.  While Invenergy has acquired ownership and control of the Grain Belt Project, Clean Line Investment maintains a long-standing, direct interest in the successful implementation of this project.  Given its originating role in this project, Clean Line Investment’s interests cannot be represented by any other party.  Therefore, this intervention is in the public interest.
Oh for goodness sake... an "interest" in a proceeding means a LEGAL (financial) interest, not a driving-by-hoping-to-see-severed-heads rubbernecking interest.  And why would any Clean Line company still exist?  Maybe it's so Invenergy has a legal entity to blame this snafu on?

What's the problem?  Well, after GBE filed a prohibited answer to MLA's protest that tried to brush all the allegations aside and pour so much mud in the water that it is impossible for FERC to see the sharks GBE let loose there, this morning MLA filed a response.

​It's short and sweet... and it makes me laugh so hard!  
20231108-5040_er24-59_response_final.pdf
File Size: 133 kb
File Type: pdf
Download File

While GBE was busy telling FERC that there was no deadline for it to inform FERC that GBE had been sold, it couldn't see the forest for the trees.  GBE told FERC that it would be selling interests in GBE and that it would apply for approval of these sales as required under Sec. 203 of the Federal Power Act.  Section 203 requires
“No public utility shall, without first having secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so -- sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the whole of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any part thereof of a value in excess of $10,000,000.” 
Wait... didn't Clean Line sell GBE to Invenergy and dispose of the whole of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission's negotiated rate authority?  Yes.  Yes, it did.

And did Clean Line first secure an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so?

NO.  NO, it did not.

I wonder if Michael Skelly is still "interested" in his failure to get approval for the sale from FERC?

Pass the popcorn!  Meow!
4 Comments

GBE FERC Amendment Questioned by Missouri Landowners Alliance

10/21/2023

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As I mentioned in an earlier post, Grain Belt Express has a long way to go to actually make its project a reality.  GBE needs approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to negotiate rates with potential customers.  Only through this process can GBE sign up customers who will pay the costs of constructing its transmission line.  Without customers, GBE is nothing but a PLAN.

Clean Line applied for, and received, Negotiated Rate 
Authority from FERC way back in 2014 based on Clean Line's corporate structure, investors, and the project it was planning to build at that time.  Once it was approved, Clean Line proceeded with an Open Solicitation.  An Open Solicitation is a fair and transparent process by which a merchant transmission line like GBE negotiates with potential customers and awards capacity on its project through the signing of contracts.  The company needed to provide wide notice of its project and the capacity it was offering so that interested potential customers could make offers and negotiate to use the project.  A company like GBE must offer the opportunity to bid and negotiate to ALL potential customers.  Customers responded to GBE's Solicitation and GBE began negotiations with them.  Except, no contracts actually resulted from that process.  At some point, Clean Line engaged in what some thought was a shady deal with MJMEUC (the 31 cities) to purchase 200 megawatts of GBE's capacity.  Was the offering widely noticed?  Were negotiations based on fair principles?  Nobody knows because Clean Line never submitted the required Compliance Filing to FERC explaining how it conducted the process that resulted in the MJMEUC contract.  Clean Line just sort of walked away from the process and never closed its Open Solicitation or made the required filings with FERC.  That was in 2016.

Since that time, Invenergy bought the project.  It should have made a filing notifying FERC that it did so and find out what it needed to do to transfer GBE's Negotiated Rate Authority to its new project.  But it didn't.  Invenergy did nothing with its NRA either.  It just simply sat there collecting dust.

Finally, just before the MO PSC approved GBE this month, GBE got inspired to file an "amendment" to its Negotiated Rate Authority with FERC.  GBE's FERC application was sort of like the one it filed at the MO PSC -- a simple "amendment" that skims over all the changes to the project and asks for approval based on stale information filed by Clean Line.  GBE was trying to pull the wool over FERC's eyes by not informing them of all the changes to the project.  They might have succeeded, but...

The Missouri Landowners Alliance filed a Protest on GBE's NRA amendment docket at FERC yesterday.  MLA's comments blew me away!  It seems that perhaps GBE has violated a bunch of FERC's rules with its actions since it bought the project, such as negotiating with potential customers without an Open Solicitation.  MLA also contended that the MJMEUC contract should be void because Clean Line never made the required Compliance Filing that required FERC's approval before the contract was valid.  GBE said that it was prepared to make the required compliance filing at some time in the future, but the MLA opined that may be difficult since it has been over 7 years since the contract was negotiated and signed by Clean Line.  Where are the records necessary to make a detailed compliance filing?  Did they go into a dumpster in Houston 5 years ago?

Read a copy of MLA's Protest here.
​
20231020-5079_mla_protest_er24-59_final.pdf
File Size: 2096 kb
File Type: pdf
Download File

Thanks to MLA's comments, FERC now knows that there are problems with GBE's "amendment" that are going to require a little more work and contemplation by the FERC Commissioners.  It's no longer a matter of a quick and simple rubber stamp.

Keep your eyes on this one!  GBE's ability to negotiate with customers is riding on it!  And, remember, no customers, no GBE!
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Missouri PSC Speculates On GBE

10/15/2023

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If wishes were horses, beggars would ride!
The Missouri PSC issued an Order last week speculating on the Grain Belt Express transmission project.  I don't know when I've seen an Order so full of mistakes and baloney before.  This is apparently what happens when a utility regulator is turned into an avenue to award political favors.  None of the current Commissioners have any knowledge or experience with the electric utility industry... and it shows!  I felt stupider after reading the Order.  Much of it was copied and pasted from the PSC's last Order approving GBE, such as:
Agricultural impacts will also be reduced because no more than nine acres of land in Missouri will be taken out of agricultural production as a result of Project structures.
The Order also says:
The Project is designed to have a minimal impact to land.  In Phase I for the HVDC Main Line approximately 9 acres will be taken out of agricultural production. For Phase I Tiger Connector approximately 0.2 acres will be taken out of agricultural production. And for the Phase II HVDC Main Line, approximately 7 acres will be taken out of agricultural production. 
How much land will be taken out of production?  A 200 foot wide strip across more than 200 miles of Missouri, that's how much.  The PSC obviously has no clue!

And then there's this ridiculous quote taken out of the original GBE Order that's like biting on something rotten.
There can be no debate that our energy future will require more diversity in energy resources, particularly renewable resources. We are witnessing a worldwide, long-term and comprehensive movement toward renewable energy. The energy on the Project provides great promise as a source for affordable, reliable, safe, and environmentally-friendly energy that will increase resiliency of the grid. The Project will facilitate this movement in Missouri, will thereby benefit Missouri citizens, and is, with the conditions set out below, in the public interest. 
There can be no debate?  Of course there is debate!  There is debate about everything, especially the failure of "clean energy" to keep the lights on despite trillions of our tax dollars being poured into this empty well.  Anyone who states that "there can be no debate" is a totalitarian lunatic!

And here's the non-debatable and speculative part...
Grain Belt has a viable plan for raising the capital necessary to finance the cost of constructing the Project on a project financing basis. Specifically, after advancing development and permitting activities to a status at which developers of wind and solar generation facilities and other potential customers of the transmission line are willing to enter into commercial agreements for an undivided interest (purchase or lease) or long-term contracts for transmission capacity on the Project, Grain Belt will enter such contracts with interested parties that satisfy necessary creditworthiness requirements. Grain Belt will then raise debt capital using the aforementioned contracts as security for the debt.


Grain Belt anticipates utilizing a combination of commercial and governmental sources of financing, and, at this time, is still evaluating all potential options for financing. Options for governmental sources of financing include the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Transmission Infrastructure Program (TIP); and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill Transmission Facilitation Program; Department of Energy loans to non-federal borrowers for transmission facilities pursuant to the Inflation Reduction Act and potentially other government funding options. Additional equity capital may also be raised to help finance construction of the Project, or Grain Belt’s existing investors may make additional equity investments in the Project.
Grain Belt Express has only one customer for just 5% of its project capacity.  It also does not have approval to finance its project on the backs of American taxpayers.

Coulda, woulda, shoulda.  It's going to be a long journey to having GBE fully subscribed, especially since GBE does NOT even have FERC's approval to negotiate rates with potential customers.  After being asleep at the switch since it bought the project from Clean Line Energy Partners in 2019, Invenergy has suddenly become inspired to "amend" the negotiated rate authority FERC granted to Clean Line Energy Partners in 2014.  Just like GBE "amended" its permit from the Missouri PSC when what it really did was create a totally new project that wasn't sufficiently reviewed.  Just because the uneducated PSC Commissioners in Missouri fell for that ruse doesn't mean FERC will as well.

Perhaps the best part of GBE's FERC "amendment" is this claim made by Invenergy:
Consistent with the Commission’s requirements for obtaining and maintaining negotiated rate authority, Grain Belt Express’s negotiated rates will continue to be just and reasonable. In the context of negotiated rates, the Commission considers whether the merchant transmission developer has assumed the full market risk for the cost of constructing its proposed project, and is not building within the footprint of the developer’s (or an affiliate’s) traditionally regulated transmission system. The Commission also considers whether the merchant transmission owner (or an affiliate) owns transmission facilities in the same region as the project, what alternatives customers have, and whether the merchant transmission owner is capable of erecting any barriers to entry among competitors, and whether the owner would have any incentive to withhold capacity.
Here, Grain Belt Express has assumed, and will continue to assume, the full market risk for the cost of constructing the Project. Grain Belt Express has no captive pool of customers from which it could recoup the cost of the Project. ​
No customers.... just captive American taxpayers who would foot the bill if GBE defaulted on a government loan, and who would pay GBE for its capacity under DOE's Transmission Facilitation Program.

There's also the matter of GBE's pending Environmental Impact Statement that won't even be in draft form until sometime later this winter.  Only after that document is finalized will DOE make a decision on whether to grant a taxpayer-backed loan.  What's a taxpayer-backed loan?  It's the same as any loan with a co-signer who is responsible for repayment if the borrower defaults.  In this case, the co-signer would be every taxpayer in the country.  GBE has applied to shift all risk for its project onto captive taxpayers.

So, the Missouri PSC approved GBE?  Big Flipping Deal.  Grain Belt Express is going nowhere without customers that will pay to build it.  There can be no debate that GBE's financing plan is a house of cards.
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Big Green Groups Pretend They Represent Landowner Interests

6/21/2023

1 Comment

 
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After watching the spectacle of all the environmental groups aligned with renewable energy company Invenergy taking up space and advocating for Grain Belt Express at the Missouri Public Service Commission a couple weeks ago, it's hard to imagine these groups are "protecting" landowner rights.  But that's just what they are currently purporting to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 

FERC has opened a Rulemaking proceeding in order to update its rules for permitting interstate transmission projects.  Although this ability was originally granted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, several court decisions nullified it for more than a decade.  However, the Investment and Jobs Act (aka Bipartisan Energy Bill) nullified the court decisions and reinvigorated FERC's authority by directing FERC to permit transmission lines that are denied by state regulatory commissions.  The time to oppose this provision has passed.  It's been signed into law.  Now we have to deal with reality.

And reality is in shaping the existing rules to make a federal permitting (and eminent domain) process as fair as possible for landowners.  A group of transmission opposition group leaders from across the country submitted initial comments to FERC last month.  We recommended several steps FERC could take, and things it could add to its review, in order to level the playing field for landowners who find themselves involved in pitched battles to save their property through no fault of their own.  Nobody asks to have a transmission line sited on their property.  It just happens.  And then these unfortunate landowners suddenly find themselves having to hire lawyers and get involved in energy permitting.  Nothing at all fair about that.  FERC should not be making participation harder for landowners.

But a bunch of other groups also filed comments at FERC, including a whole bunch of environmental, policy and partisan political groups who think we should build a whole bunch of new transmission in a big ol' hurry.  When we wrote our comments, we didn't dwell on environmental policy and environmental requirements for FERC's new rules.  That's not in our wheelhouse.  We are not the experts at environmental policy.  We left that to the environmental groups to file comments advising FERC how it should write its environmental rules.  However, those environmental groups did not give landowners the same courtesy.  After telling FERC how they love new transmission "for renewables" and demanding that FERC enable a quick and expensive transmission building renaissance, these environmental policy and political groups proceeded to weigh in on creating fair rules for landowners and local community opposition groups.  What do these groups know about transmission opposition and landowner concerns?  Turns out nothing at all.  What do these groups know about transmission permitting cases?  Turns out nothing at all.  These groups don't know diddly about landowner concerns because it is not in their wheelhouse.  They are not groups whose mission is protecting landowners from electric transmission companies.  In fact, their missions are to "help" the environment by building more wind + solar + transmission. 

Isn't that the fox watching the hen house?  You betcha!

This week, the Impacted Landowners group filed reply comments telling FERC that it should ignore the claims of environmental policy and political groups that they represent the interests of landowners.  The landowners asked FERC to hold a listening session exclusively for landowners so they could hear our concerns without us being drowned out by a bunch of know-nothings who have their own interests at heart, not ours.
rm22-7_reply_comments_final.pdf
File Size: 140 kb
File Type: pdf
Download File

What logic is there to FERC ignoring the concerns of landowners who might participate in FERC permitting cases, while shaping them to give advantage to big green political groups?  We are being marginalized by a bunch of blowhards who claim to be representing our needs but in actuality are doing nothing more than helping themselves by mowing us down.  If FERC wants to fairly issue transmission permits that are not bogged down by landowner opposition and appeals, then it must listen to landowners, not clueless policy groups who have never been involved with transmission permitting or even spoken with a rural landowner targeted by transmission.

MYOB, big green groups.  We don't want or need your "help."
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    About the Author

    Keryn Newman blogs here at StopPATH WV about energy issues, transmission policy, misguided regulation, our greedy energy companies and their corporate spin.
    In 2008, AEP & Allegheny Energy's PATH joint venture used their transmission line routing etch-a-sketch to draw a 765kV line across the street from her house. Oooops! And the rest is history.

    About
    StopPATH Blog

    StopPATH Blog began as a forum for information and opinion about the PATH transmission project.  The PATH project was abandoned in 2012, however, this blog was not.

    StopPATH Blog continues to bring you energy policy news and opinion from a consumer's point of view.  If it's sometimes snarky and oftentimes irreverent, just remember that the truth isn't pretty.  People come here because they want the truth, instead of the usual dreadful lies this industry continues to tell itself.  If you keep reading, I'll keep writing.


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